of agricultural production. Growers are sophisticated business people, many of whom are large corporations in their own right. Agribusiness is a highly competitive industry-Monsanto and every other firm in it are constrained by the razor-thin margins of agricultural producers. If a grower plants GMSs it is a certainty that he or she decided voluntarily to be bound by the terms of the contract on the basis of a self-interested determination. If, taken as a whole, such agreements are not in a grower's best interest then they will not consent to them. If the agreement is subsequently violated, a (contractual) duty has been abrogated and attempts to excuse it are misguided.
So far, so easy. Jim Tobin should have his lawyers construct an impenetrable document with explicit enforcement provisions ensuring that Monsanto, and only Monsanto, will derive any residual value from this technology. Economics and practicalities should dictate which contractual alternative is the most desirable. And this requires a careful study of agricultural distribution systems, the ideal customer (e.g. growers or distributors) and their preferences, and other technical concerns beyond the scope of this writer's knowledge. However, the Technical Solution mentioned in the case is one alternative that warrants discussion. Putatively the most promising of the alternatives listed-legally, environmentally, strategically, and otherwise-it presents formidable scientific challenges but moreover, it is subject to such profound misinterpretation and disinformation as to be wholly unworkable. Thus Monsanto has committed to not pursuing any technology that produces sterile seeds. This is, by my reading, not so much a function of the viability of the technology or any other reasoned consideration. Rather, it is a function of the way such technology has been characterized and the hopelessness of devoting resources to a solution that is bound to attract acrimonious debate.
If value capture can be achieved then growers will prosper, Monsanto will prosper, plant science research will advance, and eventually the invisible hand will work its magic and the world will be a better place-better fed and healthier anyway.
But that's too easy. Even Adam Smith knew that some invisible hands are all thumbs. This technology has been promoted on the basis of some wonderful promises: drought-resistant plants for Sub-Saharan Africa, virus-resistant sweet potatoes, rice to alleviate the iron deficiency that robs millions of Asians of their eyesight, and so forth. Where's the humanitarian factor in this "pay to play" strategy? More importantly, how does Monsanto's professed humanitarianism find a place in a strategy based on hoarding its value-financial or otherwise?
The answer, I think, requires that this value capture strategy be porousJim Tobin's wall must have some holes in it. It cannot relent with regard to commercial growers in affluent nations-they must pay to use these seeds and be prevented from planting harvested ones. But Monsanto should not press these property rights so firmly that doing so gets in the way of applying this technology to the relief of human suffering. In those cases, ability to pay should not matter.
This moral conundrum is part and parcel of the veritable smorgasbord of moral intuitions involved in patent law. Inscribed above the 15 th Street entrance to the U.S. Department of Commerce is this quote from Abraham Lincoln: "The patent system added the fuel of interest to the fire of genius." True enough, the right to exploit one's discoveries is a powerful incentive. But wouldn't there be even more of an incentive if patents were more akin to normal property rights; with exclusive use of indefinite duration without having to reveal any details to the public? Of course there would be some incremental incentives. But they would come at a price-one that has been found to be excessive by many societies, ours included. Mandatory disclosures stimulate and spread technical knowledge. Limited durations of patent grants ensures that the knowledge will not be hoarded or remain unexploited. In short, patent law strikes a compromise between self-interested property rights and social welfare.
Monsanto is legally bound to respect the letter of patent law. But owing to their self-imposed humanitarian mission they are bound morally to respect also its spirit. They must patent their discoveries, but they must also ensure that doing so does not inhibit someone else from using them for humanitarian purposes.
Consider this: making golden rice available (free of charge) to impoverished growers in Southeast Asia required Swiss researchers to gain permission to use 70 patents held by 32 different organizations. 5 Taking seriously a humanitarian commitment requires these holders to willingly concede their use. Ideally this commitment would be clearly articulated in a policy that specifies the conditions for humanitarian licensure. 6 Also, some firms have granted free access to their basic science discoveries to stimulate general research into plant genetics. 7 Whatever specific policies or practices are adopted they must make manifest the humanitarian commitments that Monsanto voluntarily undertook in their Vision: "Abundant Food and a Healthy Environment." 8 Without suggesting that this exhausts the moral issues attendant to this case, I conclude with one final thought. Had Monsanto adopted a different Vision, one that abjured any humanitarianism, would their moral responsibility be any different? What if they collapsed their vision and their mission into one simple phrase: "We're in it for the money!" I would argue that this changes nothing-morally or strategically. If the potential of this technology is real then Monsanto cannot and should not avoid moral responsibility by hiding behind the legal shield of property rights. But also, doing so would imperil their strategic objectives.
By definition, there is no financial reason to resist humanitarian appeals to license this technology. The fact that an impoverished market might become commercially viable at some future date can be handled contractually-humanitarian licenses need not be indefinite. So from a moral point of view there is no reasonable excuse for withholding the technology.
But also, resisting these appeals characterizes the firm in a most unflattering fashion in an industry where corporate image is crucial. Commenting on the early efforts to gain access to proprietary technology, Swiss researcher Ingo Potrykus said, "Legally, they had the rights, but morally I had the right." And his willingness to freely discuss his moral right with the media meant that company lawyers would not be making these decisions. Humanitarian use of this technology bears a strong similarity to recent controversies over the pricing of pharmaceuticals in AIDS-stricken Africa. Commenting on the ultimate acquiescence of pharmaceutical firms to those humanitarian appeals, Yale scientist, William Prusoff, notes, "there is a moral urge among people that, however coincidentally, can sometimes bring results." 9 Indeed, these "moral urges" can prevail but most importantly, resisting them can come at a very high price. And it should.
Ed Soule is an Assistant Professor in the McDonough School of Business, Georgetown
University.
NOTES
1 <http://www.monsanto.com/monsanto/about_us/business_purpose_miss-ion/default.htm>.
2
Swiss researcher Ingo Potrykus, creator of beta carotene-enriched 'golden' rice, explains that it is highly unlikely that academic institutions will apply genetic research to agricultural plants. His ten years of work on a single genetic application produced only one publication and this reflection: "The value of somebody is rated by their publications. No young scientist can survive this." Moreover, it is highly questionable whether government at any level would be inclined to invest in this area. Unlike human health research, agricultural sustainability does not kindle the same passions of any obvious political interest. AstraZeneca has adopted a definition of "humanitarian" use based on the annual income a grower stands to realize. 7 For example, Monsanto's "working draft" of the rice genome sequence was contributed (April 4, 2000) to the International Rice Genome Sequencing Project, a ten-member consortium of rice genome sequencing projects around the world, and is available free of charge to other researchers. This data is recognized as crucial to improved rice-its nutritional level, yields, and adaptability to seasons, climates and soils. According to estimates by the International Rice Research Institute, over half the world's population will depend on rice for their primary nutritional needs by 2020. Also, Monsanto has funded a nine-year research project with the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) to develop a virus-resistant sweet potato. The key technological discovery, a coat protein responsible for the virus-resistance, was donated to KARI royalty free.
8
As Raymond Offenheiser, President of Oxfam notes, organizations such as his ". . . are seeking to hold institutions, public and private, accountable to their own stated ideals . . . ."
